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ABSTRACT
The paper examines the impact of terrorism on economic growth
in Pakistan. Channel variables, such as foreign direct investment
(FDI), domestic investment, and government spending, through
which terrorism influences economic growth, are identified. For
empirical analysis, annual data for the period 1972–2014 are used,
and a structural model is estimated using the generalised method
of moments (GMM) estimation approach. The results reveal that
(1) the impact of terrorism on FDI and domestic investment is sig-
nificantly negative, whereas the impact on government spending
is significantly positive and (2) the net effect of terrorism on eco-
nomic growth is negative. One per cent increase in terrorism
reduces FDI by 0.104 per cent, domestic investment by 0.039 per
cent and economic growth by 0.002 per cent. To increase eco-
nomic growth more resources must be allocated to improve law
and order. To attract foreign investment, complementary domes-
tic investment must be increased.
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Terrorism is a complex phenomenon without a single agreed upon definition because
many authors have defined the term terrorism based on their own understanding of
it. The global terrorism database (GTD) defines a terrorist attack as ‘the threatened
or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political,
economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation.ʼ The
attacks on the Twin Towers on September 11, 2001 (9/11), established that terrorism
had reached a new dimension. Its roots are as much Middle Eastern as they are
European and as much religious as they are secular.
The link between peace and economic growth is indispensable because economic
development cannot occur without peace, and peace and security without growth
may not be sustainable. Terrorism has both a direct and indirect effect on economic
growth. Accumulations of physical and human capital are the main determinants of
economic growth. Terrorism, conflicts and violence destroy both physical and human
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capital and undermine the socio-political institutions that positively affect economic
growth. A country with a high level of violence loses the confidence of investors
domestically and globally, which decreases domestic and foreign investments. Further,
both human and financial resources shift abroad due to terrorist activities, which
adversely affect economic growth. Countries affected by terrorism are allocating a
considerable amount of financial and human resources to overcome terrorism and
are spending less on economic and social infrastructure, which are imperative sources
of human and physical capital accumulation. Terrorism is adversely affecting eco-
nomic growth in these countries.
There are several reasons for terrorism in Pakistan, which include among others,
ethnicity, illiteracy, income inequality, inflation, high population growth, high
unemployment, political instability, poverty, and injustice (Ismail & Amjad, 2014;
Khan, Estrada, & Yusof, 2016; Syed, Saeed, & Martin, 2015). In Pakistan, terrorism
primarily increased after 9/11, when Pakistan began playing its role as a front line
state against terrorism. Both internal and external forces are promoting terrorism in
Pakistan. These terrorist activities have negatively affected economic growth in
Pakistan. Some studies have been conducted in Pakistan and have shown that terror-
ism has deteriorated economic growth in the country (Hyder, Akram, & Padda, 2015;
Khan et al., 2016; Khan & Yusof, 2017; Mehmood, 2014; Shahbaz et al., 2013). But
these studies have explored the direct effect of terrorism on economic growth. No
study to date has been conducted to investigate the indirect effect of terrorism on
economic growth. This study tries to fill this gap using data for the period
1972–2014. Thus, the objective of this study is to examine both direct and indirect
impacts of terrorism on economic growth in Pakistan.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides literature review.
Section 3 describes the economic cost of terrorism in Pakistan. Section 4 discusses
the theoretical framework. Section 5 provides the estimated results. The final section
concludes the paper and offers policy implications.
2. Literature review
The empirical literature has shown that terrorism is harmful to economic growth
(Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004, Blomberg, Broussard, & Hess, 2011; Crain &
Crain, 2006; Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Naor, 2006; Tavares, 2004; Virgo, 2001).
Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) illustrate that transnational terrorist attacks seriously
limit economic growth. Aslam, Rafique, Salman, Kang, and Mohti (2018) demonstrate
that terrorism has adversely affected Asian stock markets. According to Barth, Li,
McCarthy, Phumiwasana, and Yago (2006), terrorism can generate inefficient
resource allocation and thus impedes output growth and capital formation. Gupta,
Clements, Bhattacharya, and Chakravarti (2004) and Ocal and Yildirim (2010) postu-
late that terrorist activities are important reasons for low economic growth in less
developed countries. In turn, Meierrieks and Gries (2012) document that there is no
link between terrorism activities and output growth. Using data for 115 countries for
the period 2000 to 2015, Çinar (2017) has found that terrorism has negatively affected
the economic growth of the countries, especially in low-income countries. The study
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has found that terrorism has affected low-income countries about three times more
than high-income countries. Choi (2015) has investigated the impact of economic
growth on terrorism using data for 127 countries for 1970 to 2007. It is found that
countries with high industrial growth are less likely to experience internal and exter-
nal terrorism.
In Pakistan, some empirical studies are available, but they have investigated the
direct impact of terrorism on economic growth and concluded that terrorism has
deteriorated economic growth in Pakistan (Hyder et al., 2015; Khan et al., 2016;
Khan & Yusof, 2017; Mehmood, 2014; Shahbaz et al., 2013). Mubashra and Shafi
(2018) have shown that counter-terrorism activities have short- and long-run effects
on economic growth in Pakistan. In Pakistan, no study to date has analysed the indir-
ect effect of terrorism on economic growth. The present study will try to fill this gap.
The objective of the study is to explore the direct and indirect effects of terrorism on
economic growth in Pakistan. To explore the indirect effect of terrorism on economic
growth some channel variables are identified, and a macro-econometric model is esti-
mated using standard econometric techniques.
The literature has identified various channel variables through which terrorism is
expected to affect economic growth (Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Frey, Luechinger, &
Stutzer, 2007; Khan et al., 2016; Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Sandler & Enders, 2008). For
instance, terrorism impedes economic growth by damaging infrastructure, foreign
trade, foreign investment, domestic savings, the currency exchange rate, tourism, and
domestic capital formation, and by increasing inflation, brain drain, capital flight,
debt burden, and government expenditure, among others. However, to explore the
indirect effect of terrorism on output growth, we use three channel variables, FDI,
domestic investment and government expenditure. We have selected these channel
variables because FDI has significantly decreased in Pakistan due to terrorism and
travel bans issued by Western countries to their entrepreneurs (Khan et al., 2016). In
2005, the FDI (net) inflow was 3.66 per cent of GDP but decreased to 0.36 per cent
of GDP in 2015. Terrorism has also destroyed capital accumulation, which is the
main input of production. In 2005, capital formation was 17.46 per cent of GDP but
decreased to 13.51 per cent of GDP in 2015. It has decreased domestic output, and
therefore, it has badly affected economic growth. Further, to overcome terrorism,
government expenditures have increased from 7.84 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 11.84
per cent of GDP in 2015. Thus, terrorism has significantly harmfully affected these
three sectors of the economy, which has thwarted economic growth.
Terrorism reduces foreign investment because foreign investors can diversify their
investment portfolio (Agrawal, 2011; Blomberg & Mody, 2005; Kang & Lee, 2007).
Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) have also documented that terrorism reduces net for-
eign investment. Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) document the negative effect of ter-
rorism on capital markets, which adversely affects foreign investment. The risks
presented by terrorism elevate the costs of business activity because costly security
measures and compensation decrease the returns on FDI. Bandyopadhyay, Sandler,
and Younas (2014) highlight that all forms of terrorism discourage FDI. Filer and
Stanisic (2016) document that terrorism reduces FDI and that, compared to portfolio
investment or external debt, FDI is more susceptible to terrorism. According to
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Shahzad et al. (2016), terrorism has a deteriorating effect on FDI in Pakistan. Similar
to foreign investment, terrorism also negatively influences domestic investment
(Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004; Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2008; Llussa & Tavares, 2011; Persitz, 2007). Terrorism has crowded-in gov-
ernment expenditures because the government must spend more money to take
appropriate security measures, which reduces output growth (Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2009).
3. Economic cost of terrorism in Pakistan
Terrorism in Pakistan mainly originated during the Soviet-Afghan war in 1980s. This
conflict brought terrorist into south Asia in the name of Jihad. These Mujahideen
were trained by American CIA and other western intelligence agencies to carry out
insurgencies in Afghanistan and to fight a proxy war against Soviet forces in
Afghanistan. Mostly these Mujahideen were not disarmed after the war ended in
Afghanistan. Some of these Mujahideen found safe places in tribal areas of Pakistan
near the Pakistan-Afghan border. After the event of 9/11 both internal and external
funded terrorists started terrorism activities in Pakistan in the name of Islam as
Pakistan was playing the role of a front line state against terrorism.
These terrorism activities after the event of 9/11 have adversely affected the econ-
omy of Pakistan. First, Pakistan observed an immediate flood of Afghan refugees,
which spilled terrorism into Pakistan. Second, the Indian insurgency in Pakistan, par-
ticularly in Balochistan province, through Afghanistan has also increased terrorist
activities because terrorists obtain financial and military support from India.
Terrorism activities have adversely affected economic growth in Pakistan. Figure 1
shows GDP growth and deaths by suicide attacks in Pakistan. Figure 1 clearly indi-
cates an inverse relationship between economic growth and terrorist attacks in
Pakistan, i.e., when terrorism is low, economic growth is high, and when terrorism is
high, economic growth is low. To overcome terrorism, a significant share of human
and financial resources have been allocated for security purposes.
In the last 17 fiscal years since the event of 9/11, Pakistan’s economy has suffered
a direct and indirect cost linked to terrorist activities of almost $126.79 billion, which
is equal to Rs. 10762.14 billion (see Table 1). Further, normal economic and trading
activities have also been disrupted, which has increased the cost of doing business.








































































Figure 1. GDP growth and deaths by suicide attacks in Pakistan (2002–2015).
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Pakistan has lost its market share and therefore remains unable to achieve its targeted
growth rates. Table 2 provides the loss to Pakistan’s economy due to terrorist attacks
by sector during the fiscal years 2014–15 and 2015–16. It is evident from the table
that foreign investment, tax collection and exports have been badly affected due to
terrorism. Other than financial and economic losses, Pakistan has also suffered
human capital loss. Over last 14 years from 2003 to 2016, 21,485 civilian and 6660
security forces personnel have lost their lives in terrorist attacks in Pakistan (see
Table 3).
To overcome the threat of terrorism, the government of Pakistan launched a mili-
tary operation (Zarb-e-Azb) against terrorists without any discrimination in its terri-
tory near the Pakistan-Afghan border in June 2014. Subsequently, in December 2014,
the government of Pakistan also began the National Action Plan (NAP) to take pre-
ventive measures against terrorism. Both the military operation and the NAP have
remained successful and have improved security conditions in the country. This
improvement has formed a suitable atmosphere for business and investment in the
country and has decreased the losses to the economy. However, Pakistan needs to
Table 1. Direct and indirect cost of terrorism (2002–2014).
Years $ billion Rs. billion % change
2001-02 2.67 163.9 –
2002-03 2.75 160.80 3.0
2003-04 2.93 168.80 6.7
2004-05 3.41 202.40 16.3
2005-06 3.99 238.60 16.9
2006-07 4.67 283.20 17.2
2007-08 6.94 434.10 48.6
2008-09 9.18 720.60 32.3
2009-10 13.56 1136.40 47.7
2010-11 23.77 2037.33 75.3
2011-12 11.98 1052.77 49.6
2012-13 9.97 964.24 16.8
2013-14 7.7 791.52 22.8
2014-15 9.24 936.30 20.0
2015-16 6.49 675.76 29.8
2016-17 5.57 572.60 15.7
2017-18 2.07 223.32 62.2
Total 126.79 10762.64
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey year book 2015–2016.




Exports 1.08 0.80 1.88
Compensation to victims 0.04 0.01 0.05
Physical infrastructure 012 0.07 0.19
Foreign investment 4.56 2.04 6.60
Privatisation 0.01 0.00 0.01
Industrial output 0.02 0.01 0.03
Tax collection 2.94 2.32 5.26
Cost of uncertainty 0.03 0.01 0.04
Expenditure overrun 0.40 0.28 0.68
Others 0.04 0.02 0.06
Total losses 9.24 5.56 14.80
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey year book 2015–2016.
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increase productive capacity by restoring damaged infrastructure and to adopt a
favorable investment atmosphere. Further, the stability in neighbouring Afghanistan
is fundamental to completely revitalise Pakistan’s economy and to sustain stability in
the system.
4. Theoretical framework
Terrorism has both direct and indirect effects on economic growth. Terrorism
impedes economic growth directly by damaging infrastructure, incurring a loss of
human capital, reducing school enrolment, reducing short-run commerce, causing
internally displaced persons (IDPs), and reallocating resources, among others.
Terrorism also thwarts economic growth indirectly by affecting macroeconomic varia-
bles, e.g., by reducing FDI, lessening domestic investment, increasing inflation,
increasing non-development government expenditures (law and order), damaging
stock markets, and increasing unemployment, among others. Sandler and Enders
(2008), Mirza and Verdier (2008), Frey et al. (2007), Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004)
and Collier (1999) have explained the channels through which terrorism impedes eco-
nomic growth. Based on theory, we take three important macroeconomic variables to
find the indirect effect of terrorism on output growth. These variables include FDI,
domestic investment and government spending because, in Pakistan, terrorism has
highly affected these sectors of the economy.
4.1. Effect of terrorism on foreign direct investment
Terrorism affects FDI in many ways. Terrorism increases insecurity and uncertainty
in the country, which causes a loss of confidence in foreign investors, causing them
to divert their resources from the host country to other, peaceful countries (Abadie &
Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2008; Agrawal, 2011; Blomberg & Mody,
2005; Enders & Sandler, 1996; Kang & Lee, 2007; Kinyanjui, 2014). Terrorism also
makes foreign investors more concerned about their expected returns from their
investment. If foreign investors do not see any increase in their expected returns in
Table 3. Fatalities in terrorist violence in Pakistan (2003–2016).
Civilians Security force personnel Terrorists/insurgents Total
2003 140 24 25 189
2004 435 184 244 863
2005 430 81 137 648
2006 608 325 538 1471
2007 1,522 597 1479 3598
2008 2,155 654 3906 6715
2009 2,324 991 8389 11,704
2010 1,796 469 5170 7435
2011 2,738 765 2800 6303
2012 3,007 732 2472 6211
2013 3,001 676 1702 5379
2014 1,781 533 3182 5496
2015 940 339 2403 3682
2016 608 290 872 1770
Total 21,485 6660 33,319 61,464
Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal.
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 1799
the presence of high levels of terrorism, then they will shift their resources from the
host country to other, safe countries. An uncertain environment makes an investor to
deem it an unproductive investment since costly security measures decrease the
returns on FDI. Terrorism also damages local infrastructure such as roads, bridges,
and telecommunications. It discourages foreign investment by increasing the cost of
doing business. Bandyopadhyay et al. (2014) document that all forms of terrorism
discourage FDI. Filer and Stanisic (2016) document that terrorism reduces FDI and
that, in comparison to portfolio investments and external debt, FDI is more suscep-
tible to terrorism. Thus, foreign investment decreases with the increase in terrorism
in the host country.
4.2. Effect of terrorism on domestic investment
Domestic investment is also an important channel through which terrorism affects output
growth. Similar to foreign investment, terrorism also decreases domestic investment
because it becomes difficult for domestic investors to invest in a terror-stricken environ-
ment. Further, public investment is also severely damaged because government projects
such as the construction of roads, highways, canals, dams, bridges, highway, hospitals,
and schools are also brought to an end in the presence of terrorist activities (Eckstein &
Tsiddon, 2004; Llussa & Tavares, 2011; Persitz, 2007). Moreover, terrorism severely dam-
ages investment in vulnerable sectors of the economy such as tourism. Terrorist activities
induce public expenditures on defence and security issues, which can crowd out public
and private investments (Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004; Gaibulloev &
Sandler, 2008).
4.3. Effect of terrorism on government spending
Terrorism increases government expenditure because the government must spend
more on security issues to maintain law and order in the country (Blomberg, Hess, &
Orphanides, 2004). This reallocation of government resources decreases expenditure
on social sector development such as health and education (Collier et al., 2003). It
will decrease economic growth. In turn, high government expenditure on security off-
sets terrorism by improving the law and order situation, which will increase both
domestic and foreign investments. It will increase economic growth.
4.4. Recapitulation
This study investigates both the direct and indirect effects of terrorism on economic
growth in Pakistan. To observe the direct effect of terrorism on growth, we estimate
the following reduced form equation:
Yt ¼ q1 þ q2TRt þ q3FDIt þ q4INVt þ q5Gt þ q6HCt þ lt (1)
To examine the indirect effect of terrorism on economic growth, we use a simul-
taneous equation model containing four equations, including an economic growth
rate and three channel variable equations, i.e., FDI, domestic investment and
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government spending. The mathematical representation of the structural model is as
follows:
Yt ¼ b1 þ b2FDIt þ b3INVt þ b4Gt þ b5HCt þ tt (2)
FDIt ¼ a1 þ a2TRt þ a3INCt þ a4TOt þ a5ERt þ a6INVt þ t (3)
INVt ¼ k1 þ k2TRt þ k3INCt þ k4CRt þ k5ERt þ k6FDIt þ t (4)
Gt ¼ c1 þ c2TRt þ c3INCt þ c4FDTt þ c5TOt þ c6AIDt þ et (5)
All variables, except growth (Yt), are expressed in natural log form, and the varia-
bles are defined as follows:
Yt ¼ Real GDP growth rate
FDIt ¼ Foreign direct investment
INVt ¼ Domestic investment
Gt ¼ Government spending
HCt ¼ Human capital index
TRt ¼ Terrorism
INCt ¼ Income level
TOt ¼ Trade openness
ERt ¼ Exchange rate
CRt ¼ Domestic credit to private sector
FDTt ¼ Foreign debt
AIDt ¼ Foreign aid
Table 4 provides the summary of the expected effect of terrorism on the channel
variables and the effect of the channel variables on economic growth.
Table 4. Effect of terrorism on economic growth.
Channel variables
Effect of terrorism on
channel variables
Effect of channel variables
on economic growth
Effect of terrorism on
economic growth
Foreign direct investment  þ 
Domestic investment  þ 
Government spending þ þ/ þ/
Net effect þ/
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5. Data overview and estimation of the model
5.1. Data overview
For empirical analysis, annual data is used for the period 1972–2014. Terrorism is the
total number of deaths, and its data is taken from the Global Terrorism Database
(GTD) and the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP). Economic growth is the real
GDP growth rate. FDI, domestic investment, government consumption, domestic
credit to the private sector, foreign debt, and foreign aid are taken as a percentage of
GDP. Trade openness is measured as exports plus imports as a percentage of GDP.
The exchange rate is defined as domestic currency per unit of foreign currency. The
data for these variables is taken from International Financial Statistics (IFS), World
Development Indicators (WDI) and Pakistan Economic Surveys. Human capital is
measured by human capital per person, which is related to the average years of
schooling and the return on education, and the data is collected from the Penn
World Table (PWT). The data for internal and external conflicts is collected from
International Country Risk Guide (ICRG). The values of both internal conflict and
external conflict scores fall between 0 (very high risk) and 12 (very low risk).
Table 5 provides the descriptive statistics of the main variables used in this study.
All three measures of dispersion, i.e., standard deviation, quartile deviation and inter-
quartile range, indicate that terrorism has the highest deviation. Domestic investment,
government spending, and external and internal conflicts also have high deviations.
The mean value of terrorism shows that, in Pakistan, 135 persons have been killed on
average from 1972 to 2014 and that this killing ranges from 1 to 2872 persons. A
similar interpretation holds for all other variables.
5.2. Estimation of a single equation model
To study the direct effect of terrorism on economic growth, Equation (1) is estimated.
An endogeneity problem is likely to arise in the model due to reverse causality
between the explanatory variables. To correct the endogeneity issue, the generalised
Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the variables.






GDP growth 4.83 4.85 10.22 0.81 2.17 1.49 2.97 43
Terrorism (number
of deaths)
470.05 135 2872 1 770.16 188.75 377.50 43
Human capital index
(per person)
1.59 1.53 2.05 1.25 0.26 0.23 0.45 43
Domestic investment
(% of GDP)
17.55 18.01 20.82 12.93 1.94 1.19 2.39 43
Foreign direct investment
(% of GDP)
0.79 0.57 3.67 0.05 0.83 0.35 0.71 43
Government spending
(% of GDP)
11.20 10.86 16.78 7.78 1.96 1 1.99 43
External conflict 7.80 8.17 11.17 5.33 1.50 1.36 2.72 31
Internal conflict 6.53 6 10.75 5 1.69 0.92 1.83 31
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method of moments (GMM) estimation technique is applied to estimate the model.
Lagged values of the variables are taken as instruments. The appendix provides the
technical details of the GMM method. Table 6 provides the estimated results. The
results in column 1 reveal that terrorism has a negative effect on economic growth and
that the coefficient is statistically significant. Economically speaking, a one per cent
increase in terrorism will decrease economic growth by 0.002 per cent. This result is in
accordance with the existing empirical literature showing that terrorism decreases eco-
nomic growth (Crain & Crain, 2006; Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Naor, 2006). Other varia-
bles have theoretically expected effect on economic growth. Human capital has
significant positive effect on growth. A one per cent increase in human capital will
increase output growth by 1.299 per cent. Both domestic and foreign investments have
statistically significant positive effects on growth. A one per cent increase in domestic
(foreign) investment will increase economic growth by 0.072 (0.009) per cent.
Economic growth also increases with the increase in government spending as the coef-
ficient of government spending is positive and statistically significant. A one per cent
increase in government spending will increase economic growth by 0.074 per cent. The
intuition is that government expenditures on security measures improve law and order
condition in the country, which boosts economic activity in the country.
In Pakistan, terrorist activities mainly began after the 9/11 attack. For robustness
check, we re-estimate our model by using a post-9/11 dummy to examine the impact
of terrorism on output growth in Pakistan. The correlation coefficient between the
post-9/11 dummy variable and the terrorism variable is 0.65, which is statistically sig-
nificant at the one per cent level of significance using t-statistics. This finding means
that we can use the post-9/11 dummy as a proxy for the terrorism variable. The esti-
mated results are reported in column 2 of Table 6, which shows that, similar to








Human capital 1.299 1.265
(50.341) (18.009)
Domestic investment 0.072 0.065
(5.433) (7.888)
Foreign direct investment 0.009 0.007
(4.759) (2.541)





Adjusted R-squared 0.989 0.994
S.E. of regression 0.016 0.018
Durbin-Watson stat 1.795 2.042
J-statistic 5.481 7.644
Prob (J-statistic) 0.601 0.664
Note: t-values are in parentheses.() shows that the value is significant at the 1% (5%) level of significance.
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terrorism, the post-9/11 dummy has a statistically significant negative effect on eco-
nomic growth. The estimated value of the coefficient implies that terrorism after the
event of 9/11 has decreased economic growth by 0.018. The magnitude of the post-9/
11 dummy coefficient is higher than the terrorism variable, which indicates that ter-
rorism after the event of 9/11 has undermined economic growth more than terrorism
in column 1. All other variables maintain their signs and significance level.
High R-squared and adjusted R-squared values indicate that the model fits the data
well. The R-squared (adjusted R-squared) value implies that 99.1% (98.9%) of the vari-
ation in the dependent variable is explained by all independent variables in column 1 and
by 99.5% (99.4%) in column 2. The autoregressive (AR) term is used in the model to over-
come the problem of autocorrelation. In both equations, Durbin-Watson (DW) statistics
are close to 2, it implies that autocorrelation problem has been removed. The high p-val-
ues of the J-statistics imply that the instruments used are valid.
5.3. Robustness analysis
The literature has shown that internal and external conflicts affect economic growth
(Cervellati & Sunde, 2011; Collier et al., 2003; Ghobarah, Huth, & Russett, 2003). The
empirical findings have also shown that external and internal conflicts can have sub-
stantial economic ramifications that result in reduced economic growth in a conflict-
ridden country (Collier et al., 2003; Collier & Hoeffler, 2004; Collier & Sambanis,
2002; Fielding, 2003) and its neighboring countries ( Murdoch & Sandler, 2002,
Murdoch & Sandler, 2004 ). Therefore, for robustness analysis, we use internal and
external conflicts as proxy variables for terrorism and estimate their effects on eco-
nomic growth. The estimated results are given in Table 7. Column 1 explains the








Human capital 1.242 1.208
(23.860) (48.194)
Domestic investment 0.075 0.078
(4.528) (25.550)
Foreign direct investment 0.015 0.012
(3.658) (5.879)





Adjusted R-squared 0.989 0.987
S.E. of regression 0.016 0.017
Durbin-Watson stat 1.592 1.622
J-statistic 6.842 8.165
Prob (J-statistic) 0.74 0.772
Note: t-values are in parentheses.() shows that the value is significant at the 1% (10%) level.
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results for external conflict, whereas column 2 explains the results for internal con-
flict. Both external and internal conflicts have statistically significant negative impact
on economic growth. A one per cent increase in external (internal) conflict will
decrease economic growth by 0.048 (0.015) per cent. After comparing the two effects,
it is evident that external conflict undermines economic growth more than internal
conflict. Human capital, domestic and foreign investments, and government spending
have statistically significant positive effect on economic growth, as was theoretically
expected. The estimated results are in accordance with the existing literature
(Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Frey et al., 2007; Sandler & Enders, 2008).
5.4. Estimation of the structural equations model
To investigate the indirect effect of terrorism on economic growth, we estimate a
structural growth model represented by the system of Equations (2–5), which com-
prises one growth equation and three channel variable equations, i.e., FDI, domestic
investment and government expenditures. Simultaneous equation bias is likely to
occur in our equations. Therefore, to remove this bias problem, the model is esti-
mated using GMM technique. Table 8 provides the estimated results of the structural
Table 8. System estimates for the structural growth model.
Economic growth Foreign direct investment Domestic investment Government spending
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept 10.411 31.001 1.612 9.305
(162.982) (19.153) (4.708) (10.546)
Terrorism 0.086 0.038 0.039
(4.467) (23.695) (15.165)
Income 0.961 0.113 0.963
(4.186) (5.539) (12.256)
Trade openness 2.157 0.131
(8.140) (7.452)
Exchange rate 0.660 0.583
(5.071) (18.932)
Foreign direct investment 0.006 0.042
(3.825) (11.985)












AR 0.903 0.522 0.906
(63.110) (41.164) (186.811)
R-squared 0.994734 0.797005 0.730116 0.854416
Adjusted R-squared 0.993911 0.768006 0.656511 0.816437
S.E. of regression 0.017957 0.477282 0.062836 0.086443
Durbin-Watson stat 1.964037 1.597732 1.869755 2.14992
J-statistic 0.420
Note: t-values are in parentheses.shows that the value is significant at the 1% level of significance.
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model. The explanatory power of the equation, represented by the R-squared, is
above 70 per cent. The autoregressive (AR) process is used to eliminate autocorrel-
ation problem. The Durbin-Watson (DW) values are close to 2, which show that
autocorrelation problem does not exist in the model. The high p-value of the J-statis-
tics shows that the instruments used are valid.
The results of growth equation closely resemble the existing findings in the empir-
ical growth literature (see, e.g., Barro, 1990, 1991; Barro & Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Levine
& Renelt, 1992). All channel variables, i.e., FDI, domestic investment and government
spending, have statistically significant positive effect on economic growth. Further,
economic growth also increases with the increase in human capital, as the latter has
statistically significant positive effect on economic growth. The magnitudes of the
coefficients show that human capital increases economic growth more than any other
variable. Our estimated results are in accordance with the prevailing literature
(Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides, 2004, Blomberg, Hess,
& Weerapana, 2004; Mirza & Verdier, 2008).
Terrorism has a significant negative effect on FDI. One per cent increase in terror-
ism decreases FDI by 0.086 per cent. These results are in accordance with previous
studies (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Fielding, 2004; Filer & Stanisic, 2016; Kang &
Lee, 2007; Shahzad et al., 2016). Foreign investment increases with the increase in
domestic income (GDP) because the coefficient on income is positive and statistically
significant. A one per cent increase in domestic income increases FDI by 0.961 per
cent. FDI appears to be a complement, rather than substitute for trade openness. Our
findings support Singh and Jun (1995) and Zakaria and Ahmed (2013), who show
that liberalised economies attract more FDI and promote its more efficient utilisation
than closed economies. Foreign investment increases with the depreciation of the
domestic currency because it will increase the return/profit of foreign investors. Thus,
the depreciation of the local currency appears to be conducive to attract foreign
investment. The statistically significant positive coefficient of the exchange rate vari-
able implies that when the domestic currency depreciates by one per cent, foreign
investment increases by 0.660 per cent. The effect of domestic investment on foreign
investment is not only positive but also statistically significant, which implies that
domestic investment complements foreign investment, i.e., foreign investment
increases with the increase in domestic investment.
Similar to foreign investment, terrorism has a significant negative effect on domes-
tic investment. A one per cent increase in terrorism will decrease domestic invest-
ment by 0.038 per cent. This result is also in accordance with the previous literature
(Eckstein & Tsiddon, 2004; Llussa & Tavares, 2011; Persitz, 2007). In terms of magni-
tude, terrorism decreases foreign investment more than domestic investment, which
means that foreign investment is more sensitive to terrorism than domestic invest-
ment. Moreover, as expected, a high level of domestic income appears to be condu-
cive for domestic investment. It validates the ‘acceleration principle’ in which
investment increases with the increase in income. The statistically significant positive
coefficient of income shows that a one per cent increase in income will increase
investment by 0.113 per cent. Investment increases when the local currency depreci-
ates. When the domestic currency depreciates by one per cent, domestic investment
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increases by 0.583 per cent. This result is highly significant. In fact, depreciation of
the domestic exchange rate renders exports less expensive, thereby favorably affecting
domestic investment. The significant positive coefficient on foreign investment shows
that it complements, rather than substitutes for, domestic investment. Finally, as was
theoretically expected, domestic credit (to the private sector) has a positive effect on
domestic investment. A one per cent increase in domestic credit will increase domes-
tic investment by 0.230 per cent. This finding means that when the private sector has
more credit, firms will invest more in business, which will increase investment in
the country.
Terrorism has a positive impact on government consumption. The coefficient on
terrorism is statistically significant, indicating that a one per cent increase in terrorist
activities increases government spending by 0.039 per cent. This result supports the
notion that terrorism increases government spending because the government has to
take appropriate security measures (Nasir & Shahbaz, 2015). These results corroborate
previous studies (Arunatilake, Jayasuriya, & Kelegama, 2001; Gaibulloev & Sandler,
2009; Gupta et al., 2004). Income has a positive impact on government spending
because, when income increases, government revenues will also increase and, hence,
government spending will increase. Trade openness positively affects government
spending. This result substantiates the notion of Cameron (1978) and Rodrik (1998)
that public spending is higher in more trade liberalised countries because they are
vulnerable to external shocks and the government reduces risk. Foreign aid also ena-
bles the government to increase its consumption. A one per cent increase in foreign
aid will increase government spending by 0.163 per cent. However, high foreign debt
decreases government expenditure in Pakistan. Both these variables are statistically
significant.
Table 9 summarises the channel effects of terrorism on economic growth. The
impact of terrorism on each channel variable is presented in column-1, whereas the
effect of each channel variable on economic growth is presented in column 2.
Column 3 is the product of columns 1 and 2, which shows the indirect effect of ter-
rorism on economic growth through the channel variables. Terrorism has statistically
significant impact on economic growth through all three channel variables. Terrorism
negatively affects growth by decreasing foreign and domestic investments, whereas it
positively affects growth by increasing government spending. The indirect net effect
of terrorism on economic growth is 0.002, which implies that when terrorism
Table 9. The contribution of effect of terrorism on GDP growth.
Channel variables
Effect of terrorism on
channel variables
Effect of channel variables
on economic growth
Effect of terrorism on
economic growth
(1) (2) (3)
Foreign direct investment 0.104 0.006 0.001
(3.568) (3.825) (2.230)
Domestic investment 0.039 0.044 0.002
(25.263) (4.128) (4.036)
Government spending 0.039 0.034 0.001
(7.951) (5.258) (4.963)
Net effect 0.002
Note: t-values are in parentheses.() indicates that the value is significant at the 1% (5%) level of significance.
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increases by one per cent, economic growth shrinks by 0.002 per cent. These results
are in accordance with the previous literature (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003, Abadie
& Gardeazabal, 2008; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2014; Blomberg, Hess, & Orphanides,
2004; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2008). The results show that the indirect effect of terror-
ism on economic growth (0.002) is equal to the direct effect (Table 6).
6. Conclusion
The paper empirically examines the effect of terrorism on economic growth in
Pakistan, using data for the period 1972–2014. The results show that terrorism has a
negative effect on output growth in Pakistan. The direct effect shows that a one per
cent increase in terrorism will decrease output growth by 0.002 per cent. This result
is robust when the post-9/11 dummy is used as a proxy variable for the terrorism
variable. Further, when the external and internal conflict variables are used, the
results remain the same, i.e., both external and internal conflicts have a negative effect
on economic growth in Pakistan. To explore the indirect effect of terrorism on
growth, three channel variables—FDI, domestic investment, and government con-
sumption—have been identified. The results show that terrorism decreases both FDI
and domestic investment, whereas it increases government spending, and these results
are statistically significant. The results reveal that terrorism negatively affects growth
through FDI and investment, whereas it positively affects growth through government
consumption. The overall effect of terrorism on economic growth is negative. Thus,
the indirect effect of terrorism on economic growth is the same as the direct effect.
This paper has some policy implications. The government is taking military action
against terrorists in the country to remove internal conflict; however, the government
should allocate some budgetary funds for socio-economic development in war-
affected areas to remove the root causes of terrorism such as poverty, illiteracy,
income inequality, unemployment, and injustice. Doing so will decrease terrorism by
increasing the opportunity cost of terrorism (Frey & Luechinger, 2003) because mili-
tary operations, which increase the material costs of terrorism, are not successful in
the long run (Feridun & Shahbaz, 2010). The government should also formulate for-
eign policy to end external conflict with neighbouring countries. Further, the govern-
ment should take appropriate steps at international levels to remove foreign-funded
terrorism in Pakistan from neighbouring countries. Not only is terrorism adversely
affecting Pakistan’s economy, but the bad image that Pakistan projects to the world is
also hurting foreign investment in the country. The government should portray a soft
image of the country to attract FDI. Further, the government should provide diversi-
fication opportunities to foreign investors with a lower terrorism risk, and a high
return and compensation may be provided for high-risk projects. Since terrorism
positively affects economic growth through government expenditures, more resources
should be allocated to improve levels of law and order in the country because doing
so is beneficial for economic growth.
The main limitation of the study is that it has used only three channel variables
for the analysis. Some other channel variables like inflation rate, defence expenditure,
etc. can also be used for analysis. This is left for future research. Future research can
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also be carried out using monthly and quarterly data and by formulating any terror-
ism index.
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Notes
1. Each equation has some excluded variables, and therefore, the order condition for
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Appendix
Generalised methods of moment (GMM)
The generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation technique was formalised by
Hansen (1982). Consider the following model:
Yt ¼ X0tbþ lt
where Xt is a vector of explanatory variables and b is a vector of the regression coefficients
and lt is the error term. The moment conditions are




  ¼ E ltXt½  ¼ 0 for all t
iii. E ltuj½  ¼ 0 for all t 6¼ j
E ltXt½  ¼ 0 is the key condition in estimating b: In the presence of endogeneity, E ltXt½  6¼
0 but E ltZt½  ¼ 0; where Zt is the vector of instruments that is correlated with Xt but not with
the error term. If Xt is N  K;Zt is N  L matrices, and L > K; then there are more instru-
ments available than regressors, i.e., the equation is over-identified. The vector of the parame-









  h i
Thus, the optimal solution for b is
b̂ ¼ X0ZWZ0Xð Þ1 X0ZWZ0Yð Þ
Note that
var Z0lð Þ ¼ r2l Z0Zð Þ
and if W ¼ Z0Zð Þ1; then higher weights will be given to moment conditions with lower vari-
ance. This leads to
b̂ ¼ X0Z Z0Zð Þ1Z0X
  1
X0Z Z0Zð Þ1Z0Y
Like Two Stage Least Square (2SLS), GMM is also an instrumental variable estimator,
which selects parameter estimates such that the correlations between instruments and distur-
bances are close to zero. However, it is a step further to 2SLS estimators as it uses all moments
by minimising their difference from zero. It also utilises variance-covariance matrix of all
moments to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation and gives more weight to that
moment which possesses small variance. In this way GMM provides consistent and asymptot-
ically efficient estimates.
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